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INTRODUCTION
This Comment engages with a central dilemma about the legal order
of the European Union: is the EU a constitutional system, a treaty system,
or a hybrid system for which we must develop a new conceptual vocabu-
lary?1 Besides intrinsic interest, resolving this categorization problem is
important for deciding a number of issues in European Union law. For
example, are legal strategies that are normally available to parties in inter-
national law viable in the European legal order?2 Should Community law
be supreme over national law? If so, what limits should be placed on that
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Jacqueline Vayntrub, Diane Redleaf, John Atchley, Jacquelyn Godin, and other members of
the Michigan Journal of International Law who gave comments on earlier drafts.
1. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 128
(1999) (“The argument in favour of the proposition that Community law is a sub-system of
international law is that it was created by a set of treaties and owes its continuing existence
and validity to them. . . .”); HENRY G. SCHERMERS & DENIS F. WAELBROECK, JUDICIAL
PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 89–95 (1987); Richard Plender, The European
Court as an International Tribunal, CAMBRIDGE L.J. 279, 279 (1983) (noting that scholars
have described Community law variously as “constitutional,” “supranational,” or as an ex-
ception to a “regular pattern of international law”); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the
Making of a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 1 (1981) (claiming that the
Court of Justice has employed a constitutional rather than international mode of interpreta-
tion); Derrick Wyatt, New Legal Order, or Old?, 7 EUR. L. REV. 147 (1982).
2. See Paul Craig, Constitutions, Constitutionalism, and the European Union, 7 EUR.
L.J. 125, 133 (2001) (discussing the Court of Justice’s rejection of retorsions in Commission v.
Luxembourg and Belgium).
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supremacy, and “who should have the ultimate power to decide the
boundaries of Community competence[?]”3 Although some scholars have
properly cautioned that the answer to these questions “do not inexorably
follow from the choice between the competing visions of Community legal
order,” the categorization nonetheless suggests which alternative should
more naturally follow.4 One might compare this European issue to the
ongoing debate in the American legal community about whether the Con-
stitution is an agreement between the states or an agreement between the
people independent of the states.5 Although answering the question leaves
much room for debate about the boundaries of federalism, it does suggest
a great deal about one’s orientation, and in some cases may even deter-
mine the ultimate outcome.6
In arguing against the idea that the EU is a constitutional system,
some scholars have noted the difficulty individuals have in challenging acts
of Community institutions as a particularly glaring fault.7 This deficiency
matters, so the argument goes, because the possibility of effectively chal-
lenging wrongful government acts is essential to the rule of law in any
constitutional system, and if the EU does not have an effective system of
challenging government acts then the regime cannot be considered consti-
tutional.8 EU defenders typically reply that there are no major deficiencies
in the EU system with regard to individual standing, since the EU treaties
give individuals a “complete system of remedies.”9 Moreover, even con-
ceding that there are some gaps, the reply continues, these gaps are not
significant enough to be relevant for the categorization problem, since it is
just as hard for individuals to challenge government acts in many national
legal systems as it is in the EU.10
3. Id. at 134.
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding, and
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996) (for a discussion on the current
effect that the Tenth Amendment has on U.S. federalism).
6. Compare U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton 514 U.S. 782, 838–45 (1995) (Kennedy, A.,
concurring) (noting at the outset of his concurrence that the Constitution “created a legal
system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two orders of government, each with
its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of mutual rights and obligations to the
people who sustain it and are governed by it”), with U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S.
782, 846–47 (1995) (Thomas, C., dissenting) (noting at the outset of his dissent that “[t]he
ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual
State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”)
7. Case C-583/11, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami et al. v. Parliament & Council, 2013 E.C.R.
I___, ¶ 1 (noting the historical difficulty individuals have faced in finding a remedy against
EU acts of general application) [hereinafter Kokott].
8. But see Craig, supra note 1, 126–27 (discussing Joseph Raz’s views about the key
features of constitutions, and claiming that “not all constitutions will necessarily contain all
the features”).
9. Case C-50/00, Unio´n de Pequen˜os Agricultores v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. I-668, ¶ 28.
10. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 38.  The Inuit II case is central to this discussion.  Case T-
526/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Eur. Comm’n, 2013 E.C.R. I___ [hereinafter
Inuit II].
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This Comment explores this debate by explaining the standing re-
quirements for individuals who wish to challenge acts of Community insti-
tutions in light of the European Court of Justice’s (“ECJ”) recent
judgment in Inuit II, which clarified the scope of the looser standing re-
quirements introduced by the Lisbon Treaty. The Comment then com-
pares these requirements to the equivalent requirements in several of the
EU member states, finding that the EU’s standing requirements are actu-
ally more friendly to individuals than the rules of several member states in
certain respects, while not appreciably worse in others. Although this find-
ing cannot settle the debate about what sort of individual standing rules
are appropriate for a constitutional system, what it may do is suggest
which side of the debate has more to prove. Those who would advance
“gaps in standing” as an argument against the EU’s constitutional status
need to explain why the same gaps are not significant for the constitutional
status of member states, or else find themselves arguing that several of the
EU member states do not really have constitutional systems either.
The Comment proceeds as follows.  Part I provides background infor-
mation on the two types of challenges, direct and indirect, that private
parties can bring against EU acts. Section I also introduces the two legal
procedures in which such challenges are typically be brought, actions for
annulment and preliminary reference proceedings. Part II describes the
standing requirements for individuals challenging EU community acts in
each procedure, identifying the potential “gap” that falls between the two.
In order to evaluate how aberrant the gaps in standing are at the EU level,
Part III analyzes the legal systems of several European countries, finding
that standing gaps are also prevalent at the national level. The conclusion
summarizes the findings of the study and points toward a future line of
research.
I. BACKGROUND ON INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS AND
REMEDIES IN THE EU
The EC treaties provide two pathways for individuals to challenge acts
of Community institutions: direct and indirect challenges.11 An individual
can challenge the acts directly in a European court, either the General
Court (formerly Court of First Instance) or the ECJ, in a procedure known
as an action for annulment.12  If the individual is successful, the European
court will declare the act of the EU institution void and that institution
will need to “take the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of
11. See HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 58; POLICY DEPARTMENT C: CITIZENS, RIGHTS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, STANDING UP FOR YOUR RIGHTS IN EUROPE 32 (2012).
12. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION
LAW 129 (3rd ed. 2011). See also How the EU Works, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa.eu/
about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice/index_en.htm#case3 (last visited May 14, 2014)
(noting that the European Court of Justice hears five types of cases, and that the purpose of
an action for annulment is to challenge “EU laws thought to violate the EU treaties or funda-
mental rights”).
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the Court.”13 On the other hand, the individual can also use the action for
annulment to challenge a Community act indirectly in the course of pro-
ceedings that have some other purpose, if the Community act’s legality is
relevant to the primary proceedings.14 To take a concrete example, a com-
pany might challenge an EU institution’s decision about the range of per-
missible prices for its product, and in the course of doing so might argue
that the institution’s authority to make that decision was based on an ille-
gal regulation.15 If the European court agrees that the related Community
act is illegal, it will annul the act that is the subject of the proceedings, but
will not annul the related Community act.16 To return to the previous ex-
ample, the court would invalidate the EU institution’s decision about the
range of permissible prices, but would not invalidate the regulation that
provided the legal basis for that institution’s decision, notwithstanding the
fact that the reason to invalidate that decision was that the regulation is
illegal. Hypothetically, then, the “illegal” regulation could still serve as the
legal authority for future acts, and indeed this lack of resolution is inher-
ent in the nature of the indirect action. By contrast, if the regulation had
been challenged directly, then the regulation would have been the subject
of the proceedings and, therefore, could be invalidated.
Although one might infer from this discussion that plaintiffs who en-
gage in indirect challenges have made a legal misstep, there are two rea-
sons this is not the case.  First, individuals will often lack standing to
challenge Community acts that have broader application, so indirect chal-
lenges will be their only recourse, at least in annulment actions.17 Second,
the difference between the outcomes of the direct and indirect action is,
practically speaking, much less significant than it might be in theory.18 For
a significant difference to arise, one would have to assume that a Commu-
nity institution would take legal action based on a norm that a European
court has already decided is illegal, and scholars have reasonably supposed
that such actions will be rare.19 Moreover, as an additional protection, the
13. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 129 (quoting Consolidated Version of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 266, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 163 [here-
inafter TFEU]).
14. T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 411 (5th ed.
2003).
15. See, e.g., Case 92/78, Simmenthal v. Commission, 1979 E.C.R. 777.
16. ALINA KACOROWSKA, EUROPEAN UNION LAW 447 (2013).
17. See Albertina Albors-Llorens, Remedies Against the EU Institutions After Lisbon:
An Era of Opportunity?, 71 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 507, 528–29 (2012) (discussing the Inuit II case
and its implications). The reason that individuals can fail to have standing to challenge acts of
broad application are discussed in greater detail in Part II. Put simply, under EU law, an act
must specifically target the plaintiff in order for the plaintiff to deserve the right to challenge
the act directly in court, but acts of general application are usually not specific to any
plaintiff.
18. The notion that there is a hypothetically, but not practically significant difference
between direct and indirect annulment is advanced by some authorities, but not all. Compare
BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 182, with CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 25, at 437–38.
19. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 182.
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ECJ has authorized national courts to consider indirectly challenged act as
void.20 For these reasons, it is unclear whether the ultimate remedy indi-
rect challenges provide plaintiffs is in fact worse than the remedy they get
via direct challenge.
Although one might assume that indirect challenges can only arise out
of actions for annulment initiated in a European court, in fact other pro-
ceedings can also lead to indirect challenges.21 From the individual’s per-
spective, the most important additional avenue for indirect challenges is
preliminary reference.22 Preliminary reference is a procedure that allows
national courts to ask European courts for an opinion on how to interpret
the EU treaties or Community acts.23  A preliminary reference results in
an indirect challenge when, in order to answer the question posed by the
national court, the court must decide on the validity of another EU act.
Because preliminary references are filtered through the national
courts, they are a potentially precarious means for individuals to access
European courts.24 On the one hand, if a national court believes an indi-
vidual’s claim has no merit and believes that no other national court would
disagree, it has no obligation to refer.25  On the other hand, a national
court cannot on its own declare the act of a Community institution invalid,
even if clearly invalid, instead it must refer the matter to the European
courts.26 Arguably, this one-sided discretion “stacks the deck” against in-
dividuals who wish to challenge EU acts. When an individual draws an
unsympathetic judge who declines to give a reference, the individual may
be prevented from accessing the institution that can give relief.27 Yet if the
individual draws a sympathetic judge who does refer the case, the individ-
ual will have to convince another court that its position has merit, this time
at the European level.28
20. See, e.g., Case 66/80, Int’l Chemical Corp. v. Amministrazione delle Finanze 1981
E.C.R. 1191.
21. HARTLEY, supra note 14, at 395.
22. Id. at 389.
23. See Alec Stone Sweet & Thomas Burnell, Constructing a Supranational Constitu-
tion, in ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE 70–71 (2004).
24. CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, EU LAW TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS, 442, 506 (5th ed.
2011).
25. See Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry of Health
[hereinafter CILFIT], 1982 E.C.R. 3415, ¶ 21; Case 495/03, Intermodal Transports BV v.
StaatssE.C.R.etaris van Financie¨n, 2005 E.C.R. I-8151, ¶ 1. See generally In re Socie´te´ des
Petroles Shell-Berre 1964 C.M.L.R. 462; DAMIAN CHALMERS ET AL., EUROPEAN UNION
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 174 (2013); CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 506.
26. Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lu¨beck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199, ¶¶
17, 20.
27. Anthony Arnull, The Use and Abuse of Article 177 EEC, 52 MOD. L. REV. 622,
626, 631–36 (arguing that refusal to make reference because the law is “clear” is particularly
common in the UK).
28. See Case C-50/00, Unio´n de Pequen˜os Agricultores v. Council, 2002 E.C.R. I-6681,
Opinion of AG Jacobs, ¶ 42 [hereinafter Jacobs].
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While this asymmetry might appear to be a significant lacuna in the
system of remedies, there are at least two responses. First, the unfairness
of one-sidedness is ameliorated by the fact that national courts of last re-
sort have a duty to refer.29 An individual who initially confronts an unsym-
pathetic judge can appeal and eventually arrive at a national court that is
required to forward the question to the European courts. The situation is
not bad luck you lose; good luck play again, rather the situation is good
luck play again; bad luck play again at least twice more. As a practical
matter, however, it is possible that the duty may not apply to any national
court.30 In Sweden, for example, whether a court of appeals is the court of
last resort depends on whether the highest court “grants certiorari,” but
applying for certiorari takes time and, if certiorari is declined, it may be
too late for the court of appeals to refer.31  Although one might suppose
that the ECJ would try to guard against such a catch-22, so far it has not
really done so, perhaps because it feels European courts are poorly posi-
tioned to begin “a complex and time consuming inquiry into the details of
national procedural law.”32 Even in states where preliminary reference is
eventually guaranteed, the need for multiple appeals seriously burdens in-
dividual parties.33
Given these concerns, the system of remedies in the EU requires a
second defense.  Arguably, the difficulty of having one’s challenge heard
via preliminary reference is simply a reason for individuals to prefer ac-
tions for annulment.34 Given that actions for annulment do exist, indirect
challenges via preliminary reference might be considered a superfluous
means for challenging Community acts.35 Since individuals enjoy unusual
advantages in preliminary reference, including the avoidance of statutes of
limitations, it is only fair for the Community to expect individuals to con-
vince a national court that the matter is worth the European courts’
29. TFEU art. 267.
30. See CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 446.  Craig and de Bu´rca propose two
possible interpretations that explain when there is a mandatory duty to refer under Art.
267(3) of the TFEU.  On the one hand, the “abstract theory” holds that only courts “whose
decisions are never subject to appeal” are covered by Art. 267(3). In the alternative, the
“concrete theory” holds that the duty applies whenever the court’s decision is not “subject to
appeal in the type of case in question.” The abstract theory makes the duty to refer more
restrictive. Since the goal of this paper is to identify standing gaps even if the most individual-
friendly interpretation of the treaty is given, this discussion assumes that the “concrete the-
ory” is the correct one. For what it is worth, Craig and de Bu´rca argue that this interpretation
has in fact prevailed. See also Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 592;
Case C-99/00, Judgment of the Court – Kenny Rolan Lyckeskog, 2002 E.C.R. I-4876, para.
19; Case C-210/06, Summary of the Judgment – Cartesio Oktato´ e´s Szolga´ltato´ bt, 2008
E.C.R. I-09641, paras. 77–78.
31. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 340–41.
32. Jacobs, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 52.
33. Id. ¶ 44.
34. Laurence W. Gormley, Judicial Review: Advice for the Deaf?, 29 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 655, 665–72 (2006) (paraphrasing the AG Jacobs Opinion).
35. But see Case T-177/01, Je´go-Que´re´ et Cie SA v. Comm’n Eur. Cmtys., 2002 E.C.R.
II-2365. See generally CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 502–07.
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time.36 The plausibility of that conception depends critically, however, on
preliminary reference not being the primary or only means for some class
of plaintiffs to access European courts. If preliminary reference is not a
“backdoor” but rather the only door, then the difficulties individuals face
in getting a preliminary reference from national courts is itself an access
problem at the EU level.
II. STANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR INDIVIDUALS CHALLENGING
COMMUNITY ACTS
With an understanding of the two procedures that get an individual
into a European court, the inquiry may begin to focus on the standing
requirements individuals face along each path. In regard to indirect chal-
lenges via preliminary reference, the standing requirements for the court
of first instance depend on the standing rules in each member state, dis-
cussed in some detail in the next section. In regard to challenges made via
annulment actions, the standing requirements for individuals were for
many years codified in Article 230 of the TEU.37 According to the ECJ’s
interpretation of this article, the standing requirements an individual faces
depended critically upon the type of legal action that had been taken.38
Since the Lisbon Treaty, the standing requirements have been codified in
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Article 263,
where the text has been changed, ostensibly with the purpose of lowering
access barriers for individuals.39 As the discussion will reveal, the Treaty
revisions and their subsequent interpretation in Inuit II have expanded
individual standing relative to what was realistically available under Arti-
cle 230 and ECJ precedent, yet they have also made the test less flexible.40
On the one hand, this development brings clarity by allowing courts to
bypass the thorny characterization problems. On the other hand, with less
flexibility to interpret Community acts in a certain way, the ECJ has ar-
guably crystallized theoretical standing gaps that might have been
maneuvered around under the Article 230 jurisprudence.
To evaluate the new requirements, a natural starting place is the text
of the TFEU. The first standing requirement is that the challenged act fall
within the scope of judicial review.41 Giving an individual standing serves
no purpose unless the court has the power to void the challenged act. Ac-
36. Case C-263/02, Comm’n Eur. Cmtys. v. Je´go-Que´re´ & Cie SA, 2004 E.C.R. I-3425.
37. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 134.
38. See CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 465, 486–88. See, e.g., Anthony Arnull,
Private Applicants and the Action for Annulment under Article 173 of the EC Treaty, 32 COM-
MON MKT. L. REV. 7, 19 (1995).
39. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 33.
40. The view that individual standing had expanded after the Lisbon Treaty was widely
understood even before the Inuit II decision. See, e.g., CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 25, at
414; CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 510.  What was not necessarily known was how
the ECJ would interpret “regulatory act.” See CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 25, at 414–15.
41. See TFEU art. 263.
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cording to the first paragraph of TFEU Article 263, the European Court
of Justice is empowered to engage in judicial review:
[O]f legislative acts, of acts of the Council, of the Commission and
of the European Central Bank, other than recommendations and
opinions, and of acts of the European Parliament and of the Euro-
pean Council intended to produce legal effects vis-a`-vis third par-
ties. It shall also review the legality of acts of bodies, offices or
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-a`-vis
third parties.42
One noteworthy aspect of this paragraph is that the ability to exercise
judicial review depends on both the type of act and the institution that
acted.43 For example, the ECJ apparently has no authority to review acts
that are classified as recommendations or opinions and originate from the
Council, Commission, or Central Bank.44 One might be tempted to as-
sume further that the ECJ lacks the power to review acts of Parliament
that do not intend to produce legal effects with respect to third parties. Yet
some of these same acts might be “legislative,” since they do arise from
Parliament, so no automatic categorization is possible. Individuals need
not be too concerned that the scope of judicial review will prove a signifi-
cant barrier, however, since the Court has broad latitude to consider acts
intended to have third-party effects. It is hard to imagine an individual
wanting to go to court unless there were some third-party effects the indi-
vidual found objectionable.
Similar to the requirements of judicial review described in Article 263,
paragraph 1, the individual standing requirements contained in Article
263, paragraph 4 vary depending on the kind of act being challenged. To
understand why these requirements are so problematic, it is useful to have
a taxonomy of the various kinds of acts that Community institutions can
take. Community acts include opinions, recommendations, regulations, de-
cisions, and directives.45 The first two types of actions are not binding,46 a
fact that can help explain why they were placed beyond the scope of court
review in Article 263, paragraph 1. Regulations are acts that apply gener-
ally and directly to individuals in the member states.47 Decisions, on the
other hand, “relate[ ] only to the one or more persons specifically ad-
dressed in it.”48 Directives are addressed to the member states and in-
struct them to achieve a result, but give the member states choice as to
42. Id.
43. CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 485–86.
44. See, e.g., CILFIT, 1982 E.C.R. 3415. See also Inuit II, 2013 E.C.R. I___.
45. TFEU art. 288.
46. Case 151/88, Italy v. Eur. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 1255, ¶ 21. See also HARTLEY,
supra note 1, at 109 (“opinions and recommendations are not binding at all”).
47. CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 25, at 98.
48. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 76.
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how they will implement the measure.49 Although these five types com-
prise the bulk of Community acts, they are not the only types of acts, as
the text of the treaty and ECJ precedent have made clear.50 Article 288
does not define “regulatory acts,” for example, a kind of act for which
there are different standing requirements, nor does it define “legislative
acts,” a concept that the ECJ has said is critical to understanding what
regulatory acts even mean.
Besides the problem of sui generis terms like these, the ECJ has also
grappled with acts that other institutions have described one way, yet for
which the name does not really fit. What does one call a decision that has
no addressee, for example? Although this possibility may sound hypothet-
ical, roughly ten percent of all measures adopted have taken this form.51
Indeed, the TEC implicitly anticipated such categorization problems when
it gave individuals standing to challenge “decision[s] which, although in
the form of a regulation or a decision addressed to another person, [are] of
direct and individual concern to the former.”52 Given the treaty’s recogni-
tion that form was not conclusive, it is unsurprising that the ECJ’s juris-
prudence held that an individual’s access to court depends not on how the
Community institution phrased the act, but rather what the act did.53 A
Community institution could not immunize its acts from challenge simply
by phrasing its action as something besides a decision. As a result, deter-
mining the formal category to which the act belonged was an important
step in judicial decision-making prior to the Lisbon Treaty.
The Lisbon Treaty did much to extricate standing requirements from
difficult questions about how to properly taxonomize a Community insti-
tution’s act. According to paragraph four of Article 263 TFEU, so long as
the matter falls within the scope of the ECJ’s powers of judicial review,
Any natural or legal person may . . . institute proceedings [(1)]
against an act addressed to that person or [(2)] which is of direct
and individual concern to them, and [(3)] against a regulatory act
which is of direct concern to them and does not entail implement-
ing measures.54
49. TFEU art. 288.
50. CHALMERS ET AL., supra note 25, at 98 (noting international agreements are not
mentioned in this provision). See also Herwig Hoffman, Legislation, Delegation and Imple-
mentation under the Treaty of Lisbon: Typology Meets Reality, 15 EUR. L.J. 482, 483 n.6
(2009) (noting that individual provisions of the treaties provide for such varied acts as “com-
mon strategies”).
51. Armin Von Bogdandy et al., Legal Instruments in European Union Law and their
Reform: A Systematic Approach on an Empirical Basis, 23 Y.B. EUR. L. 91, 97 (2004).
52. Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 230, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33
[hereinafter EC Treaty], available at https://www.ip-rs.si/fileadmin/user_upload/Pdf/EC_con
sol_Treaty_of_EC.pdf.
53. See Arnull, supra note 38, at 14. See also, HARTLEY, supra note 1, at 103.
54. TFEU art. 263.
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Under the old TEU treaty, where phrase (1) now says “act” the text
used to say “decision.” As a result of the change, European courts no
longer need to assess whether an act that was not labeled a decision never-
theless might be one for the purposes of standing.55 Yet phrase (3) also
introduces the notion of a regulatory act, “an expression that is not de-
fined anywhere in the Treaties.”56 The ECJ’s recent Inuit judgment, how-
ever, confirmed an interpretation first put forward by the Court of First
Instance and endorsed by AG Kokott: “regulatory act[s]” are “acts of gen-
eral application other than legislative acts.”57 While neither of these kinds
of acts are described in Article 288, they both have determinate meanings
based in the text of EU treaties and ECJ jurisprudence. Article 288 says
that regulations have “general application,” and case law tells us that this
phrase means that the act’s legal effects are not directed at any person in
particular.58 Meanwhile, the phrase “legislative act” is defined in Article
289 to refer to acts passed jointly by the European Parliament and the
Council, or through one of a few other kinds of procedures.59 The ECJ’s
interpretation of regulatory act in the Inuit judgment therefore does much
to simplify the question of whether an individual is in situation (1), (2), or
(3) of TFEU Article 263, paragraph 4.
While the ECJ’s interpretation does bypass questions about which la-
bel the act should have, its achievement is arguably pyrrhic. By engaging
with the question of whether an act was really a decision, the ECJ pre-
vented Community institutions from circumventing judicial review.60
However, with the interpretation given by the ECJ in the Inuit II judg-
ment, Community institutions can block off one of the three pathways for
individual challengers to having the act reviewed merely by following the
legislative procedure. AG Kokott addressed this apparent danger by not-
ing that it is reasonable to immunize legislative acts in this way, because
these acts have democratic legitimacy derived from the approval of Parlia-
ment.61 How satisfactory is this response? Even ignoring doubts about
how much democratic legitimacy an act of Parliament carries,62 it is telling
that although this argument may justify a gap, it does not even attempt to
show that the gap has been eliminated. Indeed, AG Kokott is quite explicit
in defending the continued existence of standing gaps, stating post-Lisbon
that “individuals are still not intended to benefit from easier access to legal
remedies against legislative acts.”63 The difficulty of this position for de-
55. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 373 (7th ed.
2010) [hereinafter HARTLEY’S SEVENTH].
56. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 30.
57. Id. at ¶ 51.
58. Arnull, supra note 38, at 20–21.
59. TFEU art. 289. See generally CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 121–33.
60. Jacobs, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 11.
61. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 38.
62. Jacobs, 2002 E.C.R. ¶ 86.
63. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 39.
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fenders of the Inuit II judgment is that “regulatory act” cannot be inter-
preted in such a way as to return individuals to the same position they had
before Lisbon, particularly given that the clear intent of the third part of
the paragraph on individual standing was to improve individual access to
European courts.64 AG Kokott tries to thread this needle by arguing that
even with her gloss on “regulatory act,” the Lisbon treaty has greatly im-
proved the ability of individuals to challenge the acts of Community insti-
tutions, since “as a practical matter the vast majority of acts are not
legislative.”65 For example, fishing companies that wish to challenge regu-
lations implemented by the Commission that prevent the use of nets harm-
ful to endangered species can now do so, even if they might not have
gotten standing according to the conditions described in parts one and
two.66
Moreover, while it is true that a national trade association challenging
a disadvantageous change in the regulatory regime adopted by legislative
procedure cannot do so under part three of the paragraph on individual
standing, such individuals are not completely barred from accessing Euro-
pean courts. Instead, they just have to hope that they satisfy the require-
ments of the other two parts of Article 263, paragraph 4.  In that case,
however, their position is no better than it would have been prior to the
Lisbon Treaty.67
Of the two other means of showing standing in Article 263, paragraph
4, the former is easier to establish. If the act is addressed to the person
then standing is automatic.68 Although one might expect there to be cases
that push the boundaries of what being “addressed” means, this possibility
has not materialized for two reasons. First, most individuals who come
before European courts do so in order to challenge a decision specifically
addressed to them.69  Second, case law suggests that whether someone is a
de facto addressee depends on a showing of direct and individual con-
cern.70 In other words, the discussion immediately moves to prong two of
TFEU Article 263 paragraph 4.
How does one show direct and individual concern? Direct concern
relates to the idea that the act must cause the harm that the individual has
suffered.71 In this context, the most frequent causation problem is that an
“autonomous will” may have intervened between the act of the commu-
nity institution and the individual, in which case the concern would not be
64. Compare TFEU art. 263, with EC Treaty art. 230. See generally Albors-Llorens,
supra note 17, at 517 (discussing revised Article 263).
65. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 50.
66. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 59. See also Je´go-Que´re´, 2002 E.C.R., ¶¶ 22–25.
67. Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 60.
68. HARTLEY, supra note 14, at 345.
69. BERMANN ET AL., supra note 12, at 134.
70. HARTLEY, supra note 14, at 345.
71. HARTLEY, supra note 14, at 363. See also MARIOLINA ELIANTONIO ET AL., STAND-
ING UP FOR YOUR RIGHT(S) IN EUROPE 28 (2012).
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direct.72 To illustrate, consider the facts which gave rise to Municipality of
Differdange v. Commission. The European Commission decided to permit
Luxembourg to give state aid to steel firms, but only if Luxembourg also
agreed to reduce their production capacity.73 An important steel produc-
tion center, Differdange, was not pleased with the prospect of factory clos-
ings or reductions in its tax base, and so challenged the decision.
Differdange lacked the “direct” concern sufficient for standing, in the
ECJ’s view, because the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg still had to decide
where the reductions in capacity would occur.  The problem was not sim-
ply that there was an intermediary between Differdange and the Commu-
nity institution An individual can show direct concern in spite of there
being an intermediary, so long as the challenged act “leaves no room for
any discretion,”74 in other words, that the intermediary has no choice but
to bring about the complained of effect. At times the Court has applied
this test loosely, finding direct concern where there is no genuine doubt
about how discretion would be used.75
The more onerous requirement is individual concern. The original for-
mulation of the test comes from Plaumann v. Commission, Case 25/62,
[1963] E.C.R. 95, where the ECJ said that to show individual concern the
act must “affect [the applicant] by reason of certain attributes which are
peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differen-
tiated from all other persons,”76 and moreover, that these attributes must
cause the act “to distinguish [the applicant] individually just as in the case
of a person addressed.”77 The Court went on to say that a clementine im-
porter cannot oppose a Community decision not to lower import taxes on
clementines, because although the duties might in practice affect such an
importer more than other individuals, in principle anyone could engage in
the same commercial activity as the importer challenging the EU act.78 As
the interpretation of individual concern evolved, the ECJ began to find
individual concern when an applicant was a member of a “closed cate-
gory,” which is to say a group whose members were fixed before the mea-
sure entered into force.79
72. Case T-12/93, Comite´ Central d’Entreprise de la Socie´te´ Anonyme Vittel v. Eur.
Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-1247; Case T-96/92, Comite´ Central d’Entreprise de la Socie´te´
Ge´ne´rale des Grands Sources v. Eur. Comm’n, 1995 E.C.R. II-1213; Case T-509/93, Richco
Commodities LTD v. Eur. Comm’n, 1996 E.C.R. II-1181. See generally HARTLEY, supra note
14, at 363; CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 491.
73. CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 492.
74. Case 294/83, Parti E´cologiste “Les Verts” v. Eur. Parliament, 1986 E.C.R. 1357, ¶
31. See also Arnull, supra note 38, at 20–21.
75. See Case 11/82, A. E. Piraiki-Patraiki and Others v. Eur. Comm’n, 1985 E.C.R.
227. But see Case 222/83, Mun. Differdange v. Eur. Comm’n, 1984 E.C.R. 2889, ¶ 12.
76. Case 25/62, Plaumann v. Eur. Comm’n, 1963 E.C.R. 96, at 107.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Arnull, supra note 38, at 26. CRAIG & DE BU´RCA, supra note 24, at 494–96.
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Determining whether a group is closed is not always easy; however,
the ECJ has tended to recognize a class as fixed when it consists entirely of
individuals who have made a definite legal commitment prior to the Com-
munity act.80 For example, in Codorniu v. Council, Case C-3098/89, [1994]
E.C.R. I-01853, a Spanish producer of sparkling wine was not allowed to
use the word “cre´mant” in the name of its product.81 Since anyone can
produce sparkling wine and call it “cre´mant,” one would imagine that indi-
vidual concern could not be shown, however the Spanish producer had
trademarked its product using the word “cre´mant” and for the ECJ, this
difference was enough.82 To take another example, in Sofrimport v. Com-
mission, Case C-152/88, [1990] E.C.R. I-2477, Chilean apple imports were
temporarily suspended, and individuals who had applied for import li-
censes (even up to the day that the suspension was imposed) were granted
standing.83 Synthesizing these precedents, it appears that an individual
does not get the right to initiate an action for annulment simply because a
Community act intrudes on the field in which the individual happens to be
operating. It is unsurprising, therefore, that environmental activists and
other public interest groups also had a difficult time showing standing
prior to Lisbon.84
With an understanding of the various standing requirements now in
hand, it is possible to show how one can fail to have standing. First, an
individual has no standing unless they were adversely affected by a Com-
munity act. Although this gap may not sound worrisome, it does burden
those who wish to address adverse effects before they materialize.85 In
IBM v. Commission,86 the ECJ asserted that efficacy concerns justified
this burden, since allowing individuals to challenge a Community institu-
tion before it had committed to affecting their legal position would inter-
fere with the ability of the institution to implement Community policy.
Because most of the national legal systems in the EU have made a similar
choice, critics of the EU’s constitutional status will not find much purchase
in claiming this gap is significant.87
Even assuming that the individual is adversely affected by a Commu-
nity act, it can still be impossible for an individual to showing standing. For
example, consider an act that does not require implementing measures
and is not expressly addressed to the individual affected. If the act
emerges from legislative procedure, then it cannot be a regulatory act. The
fact that there is no need for implementing measures then it is unlikely
80. HARTLEY, supra note 14, at 349–62.
81. Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v. Council, 1994 E.C.R. I-01853. See also HARTLEY,
supra note 14, at 355.
82. HARTLEY, supra note 14, at 355.
83. Case C-152/88, Sofrimport SARL v. Eur. Comm’n, 1990 E.C.R. I-2479. See also
HARTLEY, supra note 14, at 368.
84. ELIANTONIO ET AL., supra note 71, at 42–43.
85. See, e.g., Case 60/81, IBM v. Eur. Comm’n, 1981 E.C.R. 2640.
86. See id.
87. ELIANTONIO ET AL., supra note 71, at 67.
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that some intermediary will have to exercise discretion. If there is no dis-
cretion on the part of an intermediary, then the concern is direct. But even
if the concern is direct, there is no obvious reason to believe that the chal-
lenger will be capable of showing that its concern is individual. If the chal-
lenger does not have that, then it will not have standing for an action for
annulment.
An example helps illustrate how a challenger wandering through his
byzantine fortress of legal terminology might unwittingly fall into a stand-
ing gap. Such a case could arise, for example, if the EU used the legislative
procedure to ban a product in such a way as to not require implementing
measures. For example, the EU could decree that trade in stem cells is
prohibited. In this case, no one is expressly addressed by the ban.  Moreo-
ver, because the legislative procedure was used, the ban is not a regulatory
act.  As a result, the only hope for an individual to challenge such a law is
by showing direct and individual concern. But this requirement, of show-
ing direct and individual concern, is exactly the same as the requirement
that existed before Lisbon. Therefore, the same standing problems that
the revision of Article 263 was designed to address may reoccur. There are
many reasons showing individual concern could be difficult in the case of a
product ban, even if there was a substantial interest. For example, in the
case of stem cells, an inventor could have invested substantial resources
researching an idea for making stem cell production less costly, but the
inventor’s ideas could still be not quite ready for patenting, yet alone
whatever clinical trials would be necessary to actually put the stem cells to
use.88 Such an individual has only made preparations to make a commit-
ment, and does not have anything sufficiently solid to differentiate himself
from anyone else who might want to benefit from a trade in stem cells.
Indeed, in a certain telling, the Inuit who wish to continue making a liveli-
hood by selling traditional products made from seal-pelts also fit this mold,
since one might think they have a significant interest in continuing to
make their living from such products, but all their sales are highly prospec-
tive. In principle they are no different from the clementine importers in
Plaumann. What these examples show, therefore, is that although the Lis-
bon reform may result in the loosening of the standing requirements many
plaintiffs face, if an objectionable norm is enacted via the legislative proce-
dure, the standing gaps that existed prior to Lisbon can still materialize.
Those who claim the EU offers a complete system of remedies would
argue that the continued exclusion of a number of interested parties even
after Lisbon is not nearly as grave as it appears. First, prohibitions like the
one described usually require the executive to enact some implementing
measure before the prohibition becomes enforceable, and these measures
will fall into the looser requirements that apply to “regulatory acts.”89 The
only requirement upon individuals who wish to directly challenge such an
88. Case C-34/10, Oliver Bru¨stle v. Greenpeace eV, Opinion of AG Bot, 2011 E.C.R.
I-09821.
89. See Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶¶ 51–52, 56.
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implementing measure is establishing direct concern, and this showing will
not be difficult if the executive’s act is the last one necessary for the set of
rules to be complete, in other words that there are no intermediary agen-
cies that still must act. Indeed, the Inuit who were denied standing to chal-
lenge the legislative act banning seal fur imports will have the opportunity
to indirectly challenge the same legislative act in their direct action against
the Commission’s implementing regulation.90 Individuals who wish to
challenge legislative acts after Lisbon will not be shunted away from Euro-
pean courts, with preliminary reference as the only way back in, rather
their remedies against legislative acts will involve indirect challenges via
annulment actions.
In fact, public interest groups like Greenpeace may also have standing
to challenge such acts, since non-legislative regulatory acts are only subject
to the requirement of showing direct concern, and the ECJ has previously
tended to emphasize individual concern as the primary impediment for
such groups have standing.91 For the moment at least, one can argue that
access to remedies in the EU might be significantly better for such groups
than in some member states, such as Hungary, Belgium, France or Ger-
many,92 although one can imagine that the requirement of showing “legal
interest” will be further developed in coming years so as to re-exclude
public interest groups.93
If indirect challenges in actions for annulment will play a key role in
the complete system of remedies after Lisbon, it is worth exploring the
assumption that indirect challenges will always be possible. Yet, the
strongest argument for why indirect challenges will always be possible is
deeply unsatisfactory. If an individual violates a norm established by the
EU, then someone responsible for enforcing the rules will respond, at
which point the individual will have an act that they can challenge in an
annulment proceeding.94 Many consider this possibility unacceptable: a le-
gal system cannot require individuals to violate the law in order to chal-
lenge it.95 For this very reason, AG Kokott’s Opinion in Inuit II suggested
that there might be another way an individual could force into being a
non-legislative action.96 For example, an individual could write a letter to
authorities in charge of enforcement asking if a certain norm applied to
90. See id. ¶ 71.
91. Compare Case T-262/10, Microban Int’l Ltd. & Microban (Europe) Ltd. v. Eur.
Comm’n, 2011 E.C.R. II-07697 (standing to challenge regulatory act upheld as the former
only requires direct concern) with Case T-583/93, Greenpeace & Others v. Eur. Comm’n,
1995 E.C.R. II-2205 ¶ 56 (standing to challenge act of general application found lacking,
prior to Lisbon treaty, because of absence of individual concern). See also ELIANTONIO,
supra note 71, at 42–43.
92. ELIANTONIO ET AL., supra note 71, at 57–60.
93. KOEN LENAERTS & DIRK ARTS, PROCEDURAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
250–51 (Robert Bray ed., 1st ed. 1999).
94. See Kokott, 2013 E.C.R. ¶ 118–20.
95. See id.
96. See id.
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them.97 Once the authorities said yes, then the individual would have the
right to a day in court.
However, there are several inadequacies with AG Kokott’s letter-writ-
ing idea. For instance, what happens if the agency entrusted with enforce-
ment fails to respond to the request? Even assuming that the authorities
do respond, if the responsible agency is national, as they often will be,98
then one must sue in national court, meaning that the preliminary refer-
ence procedure is the only path to having the law challenged. Moreover,
giving such response letters the same legal weight as decisions,99 as AG
Kokott suggests they should be, could have the effect of eliminating stand-
ing requirements entirely. Individuals would be able to give themselves
standing simply by write a letter asking if the law applies to them.
Since the ECJ did not endorse AG Kokott’s proposal, it is not worth
belaboring her idea. In its defense, however, at least it was an idea. The
Inuit judgment does not refute the notion that conscientious violation of
the law is the only guaranteed way for individuals with significant individ-
ual interest to get standing to challenge Community acts via the annul-
ment procedure. Indeed, the ECJ seems to suggest indifference to this
possibility, perhaps rightly so given that the problem may be purely hypo-
thetical. For any legislative act there will surely exist another non-legisla-
tive act that individuals can use as a vehicle for challenging whatever
legislative act proves bothersome.100 In situations where implementation
occurs at the national level and the procedural rules do not safeguard an
effective right of challenge, the ECJ seems to suggest it is not their fault,
but rather member states that have a responsibility for making the system
an effective system of remedies.101
Rightly or wrongly, purely hypothetical or subject of actual concern,
the gap in judicial protection does exist in the European system. Legisla-
tive acts that need no implementing measures are potentially immune
from challenge by a significant class of individuals, which includes the ma-
jority of the commercial and public interest groups with the resources to
challenge such acts. To assess whether such standing gaps are uncharacter-
istic of genuinely constitutional systems, this paper now turns to the legal
systems of the EU member states.
III. STANDING GAPS IN THE EU MEMBER STATES
One of the primary difficulties when comparing administrative law
across many countries is that no two systems are quite alike, and even
attempting a comprehensive account could occupy hundreds of pages. Yet
the discussion in the previous section has substantially focused the scope
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id. ¶ 122.
100. See Case C-583/11, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami & Others v. Eur. Parliament & Council
of the E.U., 2013 E.C.R. II-0000, ¶ 93.
101. Id. ¶ 103.
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of inquiry to the following questions. Do “legislative acts,” or their rough
equivalent in the member state system, have more onerous standing re-
quirements than other acts? If so, how difficult is it for individuals such as
trade associations or environmental groups to surmount this difficulty
through other means?
Modern judicial review of the constitutionality of government acts
falls principally into one of two families: “diffuse systems” where any court
can exercise judicial review, and “concentrated systems” where judicial re-
view is entrusted to a single institution.102 The former model originated in
the United States and is pervasive throughout Scandinavia.103 The later
model was instituted in Austria in 1920, and subsequently spread to Ger-
many, Italy, and Spain.104  There are a few EU member states—Great
Britain, the Netherlands, Finland, and Luxembourg—where judicial re-
view of legislative acts is relatively inchoate.105
Although one might assume that “diffuse systems” would offer indi-
viduals robust protection from parliamentary acts, at least as a practical
matter they do not. In Norway, for example, the Supreme Court has only
struck down twenty to thirty laws in its whole history, while the Danish
Supreme Court has hardly, if ever, used its power to declare a law uncon-
stitutional.106 Although the Swedish Supreme Court hears constitutional
challenges to laws passed by parliament, it has also never invalidated
one.107 This pattern is not explained by onerous standing requirements,
but rather the highly deferential attitude of the courts to their parliaments
as well as a lack of substantive principles against which the courts can
assess the constitutionality of the law.108 Far from supporting the claim
that judicial review of legislative acts is essential to a constitutional system,
the realities of the diffuse system tend to suggest that the theoretical possi-
bility of review is perhaps less important than the chance that a challenger
will succeed on the merits.
Turning to the concentrated systems, some systems only allow consti-
tutional review to be triggered by litigation on another issue.109 This pro-
cedural arrangement is similar to the one that the ECJ seemed to envision
102. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARI´AS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 91–92
(1989).
103. VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK V. TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
465, 475 (2d ed. 2006).
104. Id. at 466.
105. Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 46 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal
eds. 1990).
106. Id. at 476.
107. Id. at 477.
108. Louis Favoreau, Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 47 (Louis Henkin & Albert J. Rosenthal
eds., 1990).
109. BREWER-CARI´AS, supra note 102, at 92.
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after the Inuit II judgment.110 Several systems do not grant the constitu-
tional court original jurisdiction to hear cases of individuals, instead the
litigation must be initiated in another court and only after the case has
been referred by the first court can the organ empowered with judicial
review act.111 In such systems, a procedure not unlike preliminary refer-
ence is the only way for individuals to have legislative acts challenged.112
Until recently, France only allowed constitutional review of legislation
prior to promulgation.113 Yet there are concentrated systems that are
much more like the European Union, allowing both reference from other
courts and original actions. In Germany, for example, constitutional cases
may be referred to the Constitutional Court or brought to the court by
individuals.114 Although the vast majority of cases brought by individuals
are against adverse judgments of other courts, a significant number in-
volve statutes or regulations, and over six hundred of these challenges
have actually succeeded in convincing the court to invalidate the law.115 In
order to lodge a constitutional complaint in Germany the individual must
exhaust other remedies, unless doing so would “entail a serious and una-
voidable disadvantage for the complainant.”116 Complaints against laws
are not admissible, however, unless the law “personally affect[s] the claim-
ant’s fundamental rights, in a direct and current way, without the need for
further administrative application of the norm.”117 Although this formula-
tion resembles the idea of “directly concern,” the notion of “personal af-
fect” in Germany is broader than the understanding of individual concern
found in Plaumann.118
Thus, individuals in general should have an easier time challenging
legislative acts in Germany than they would in the EU. From the perspec-
tive of public interests groups like Greenpeace, it is noteworthy that the
ECJ’s standing requirements as applied to non-legislative acts are, at least
for the moment, more friendly than Germany’s, given that in Germany the
possibility of defense of general interests has to be provided for by sector-
110. See discussion infra, at 19–20.
111. BREWER-CARI´AS, supra note 102, at 92.
112. See id. at 220–22.
113. Id. at 251.
114. DONALD P. KOMMERS & RUSSELL A. MILLER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRU-
DENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 31–32 (3d ed. 2012).
115. Id. at 32, 36.
116. Gesetz u¨ber das Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfGG] [Federal Constitutional
Court Act], Jul. 16, 1998, BGBL. I at 1823, art. 90(e) (Ger.), available at http://www.iuscomp
.org/gla/statutes/BVerfGG.htm#1.
117. BREWER-CARI´AS, supra note 102, at 210. See SIGRID BORN, Instructions on Lodg-
ing a Constitutional Complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court, LAW ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (Ger.) art. 3(3) (Martin Fry trans. 1996), available at http://www.ius
comp.org/gla/literature/Instrcc.htm.
118. See, e.g., Gotthard Wo¨hrmann, The Federal Constitutional Court: An Introduction,
in LAW ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT (Sigrid Born ed. Martin Fry trans. 1996),
available at http://www.iuscomp.org/gla/literature/Inbverfg.htm#Bii5 (noting three admissible
cases by individuals in open categories).
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specific regulations.119 This analysis suggests that even in the member
state with arguably the most robust judicial review, individuals do not nec-
essarily have an easier time challenging government action than they do in
the European Union. Meanwhile, in the concentrated systems with weaker
judicial review, there is no possibility for direct challenges to any govern-
ment acts, let alone acts of parliament, and reference proceedings do all
the work.
Although most EU member states fall into one of these two catego-
ries, there are a few states that are harder to characterize. The UK, for
example, has no written constitution, yet does have a set of norms that
have constitutional status and judges do exercise a kind of judicial re-
view.120 Although judges are not allowed to invalidate acts of parliament,
if parliament wants to abridge “constitutional rights” such as freedom of
assembly and right to property, it must do so specifically.121 That being
said, this rule is arguably less a form of judicial review than a canon of
construction. The situation has become more complicated in the UK since
the Human Rights Act of 1998 was adopted and declared a “constitutional
statute” that could only be repealed by unambiguous language.122 As a
result, parliamentary legislation must be interpreted in such a way as to
conform with the European Convention on Human Rights. Moreover, in
the event that such interpretation is impossible, the high courts are now
allowed to declare legislation incompatible with the treaty, although this
declaration has no binding effect.123
In contrast to the UK, which has no written constitution, the Nether-
lands has two foundational documents, a Constitution and a Charter. It is
worth noting that the judiciary does not check to make sure that legislative
acts comply with either.124 In fact, the Constitution explicitly states “the
constitutionality of acts of parliament and treaties shall not be reviewed by
the courts.”125 Similar to the UK, the fact that Dutch courts lack the
power to set aside parliamentary acts does not prevent courts from declar-
ing that they conflict with constitutional principles.126 In practice, how-
ever, the courts are reticent to take this step.127 The feature of the Dutch
system that is most like constitutional review is the ability of courts to
deem legislative regulations inapplicable when they conflict with provi-
sions of treaties, or even binding resolutions made by international institu-
119. ELIANTONIO ET AL., supra note 71, at 126.
120. GERHARD VAN DER SCHYFF, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE NETHERLANDS AND SOUTH AFRICA 12 (2010).
121. Id. at 16.
122. Thoburn v. Southerland City Council [2002] EWHC (Admin) 195, [paras. 60–67],
Q.B. 151 (Eng.).
123. VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 120, at 19–20.
124. Gw. art. 120 (Neth.); L.F.M Besselink, Fundamental Structures of the Constitution
of the Netherlands (2008), http://dspace.library.uu.nl/handle/1874/25731.
125. VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 120, at 24.
126. Id. at 25.
127. Id.
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tions.128 Indeed, individuals are allowed to sue a regulatory agency in tort
so long as they can plausibly claim an injury, and thereby obtain review of
an act of parliament for conformity with international law.129
This tour through the legal systems of several European member
states has revealed that structural barriers that prevent plaintiffs from ef-
fectively challenging legislative acts are hardly uncommon. The difference
in the ability of parties to challenge legislative acts between the EU and
the Netherlands is roughly analogous to the difference between the EU
and Germany: individuals who are substantially affected, but not a mem-
ber of a closed class would be able to challenge a legislative act in the
latter, but not the former. Yet these are only two countries, and indeed it
seems that they are the exception.  In concentrated, diffuse, and the
harder to classify member states, the general rule is that legislative acts are
difficult to challenge directly, and indirect means are what individuals
must utilize.
CONCLUSION
This Comment began by posing the question of whether the European
Union legal order is a constitutional system, a treaty system, or a hybrid.
This comparative exercise in treaty interpretation and administrative law
has contributed to this debate by debunking a claim made by those who
would insist that the EU is a treaty system, because the system of remedies
it offers is significantly less complete than what one would find in a na-
tional constitutional system. Although it is true that gaps in standing exist
and, as such, prevent some individuals from having access to courts in the
EU, the same incompleteness in regard to remedies against legislative acts
affects many of the EU’s member states. Judicial review of legislation may
be one of “the hallmarks of constitutionalism,”130 but an absolute right to
such review is not. The EU system of remedies is, at least in theory, no less
complete than many of the member states. Even if the ECJ does decide to
narrow its interpretation of direct concern in the context of regulatory acts
so as to avoid a deluge of suits from pressure groups, doing so would in no
way introduce a constitutionally significant lacuna. Germany and other
member states often significantly constrain actions in the public
interest.131
Going forward there are nonetheless serious questions to be asked
about the effectiveness of judicial remedies in the EU, however, the dis-
cussion should shift its concern from access gaps to access barriers. While
the legal requirements individuals must satisfy to have standing before the
European Court are not atypical when compared with similar require-
128. Id. at 94.
129. Tom Zwart, Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues In the Netherlands, in STAND-
ING TO RAISE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 341, 346 (Richard S.
Kay ed., 2005).
130. VAN DER SCHYFF, supra note 120, at 2.
131. ELIANTONIO ET AL., supra note 71, at 138.
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ments in member states, the practical difficulties of litigating before the
European Court might be. In short, the strategy going forward for those
who would resist the EU’s constitutional status might be to argue that al-
though the EU is in theory a complete system of remedies, the reality is
far from it. There is much work to be done assessing whether this line of
attack has any merit, but identifying the practical stumbling blocks is no
less important for EU reformers than for EU critics. If the ECJ is going to
realize the Lisbon Treaty’s goal of making it easier for individuals to initi-
ate proceedings in an EU court, then it needs to know the practical diffi-
culties that individuals face in challenging the acts of EU institutions. On
paper, at least, the system of remedies that the EU offers its citizens is
sufficiently robust to reach a constitutional standard. Yet if the actual bar-
riers to access are such that parties cannot effectively challenge the acts of
EU institutions, it is hard to see how the EU could really deserve to be
called constitutional. Even so, the theoretical standard is worth something.
It justifies the presumption in cases that the EU system of remedies is
designed to be no less complete than that which one would find in a consti-
tutional system, and that in turn suggests that it is plausible to evaluate a
broader set of issues with the presumption that the EU is more a constitu-
tional system than a treaty system.
